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“Transborder” Exchanges of People, Things, and 
Representations: Revisiting the Conflict Between Mahdist Sudan 
and Christian Ethiopia, 1885–1889* 
 
By Iris Seri-Hersch 
IREMAM-Université de Provence, France (iris_hersch@yahoo.ca)  
 
The intertwined history of Sudan and Ethiopia in the late nineteenth century has received 
relatively little attention in the literature, and the few studies that focus on Sudanese-
Ethiopian relations in the Mahdist period (1885–1898) consist of political histories fed by 
military and diplomatic events.1 Most of these otherwise valuable works lack 
transboundary perspectives that examine interaction and exchange patterns in specific 
border zones of Sudan and Ethiopia. Border studies dealing with this part of Africa 
certainly do exist; the historical and anthropological essays edited by Donald Donham and 
Wendy James more than twenty years ago analyze processes through which southern 
peripheries were incorporated into imperial Ethiopia from the 1890s up to 1935.2 These 
examples do not, however, address earlier border dynamics affecting political, economic, 
and social relations between Mahdist Sudan and Ethiopia in the 1880s. A pioneering study 
in this field is Alessandro Triulzi’s work on the Bela Shangul border region south of the 
                                                
* This paper is based on a master’s thesis titled Le Soudan mahdiste face à l’Abyssinie chrétienne: Une 
histoire de(s) représentions (University of Provence, France, June 2007). I am grateful to Prof. Ghislaine 
Alleaume, Dr. Catherine Miller (IREMAM, Aix-en-Provence), Dr. Barbara Casciarri (CEDEJ, Khartoum), 
and Pierre Liguori (CEAF, Paris), for their intellectual and material support. I also thank the staff of the 
National Records Office [hereafter NRO] in Khartoum. Archives consulted at the NRO include both Arabic 
original documents and English translations of Arabic and Amharic texts produced by Egyptian Military 
Intelligence officers before and after the Anglo-Egyptian conquest of Sudan (1898). For useful contextual 
information about the Mahdist archives, see Peter M. Holt, “The Archives of the Mahdia,” Sudan Notes and 
Records 36 (1955), 71–80. Unless mentioned, translations into English are not mine. Arabic terms appear in 
an Anglicized form retaining the Sudanese pronunciation of the letter qaf as [g]. 
1 See George N. Sanderson, “Conflict and Co-operation between Ethiopia and the Mahdist State, 1884–
1898,” Sudan Notes and Records 50 (1969), 15–40; Richard A. Caulk, “Yohannes IV, the Mahdists, and the 
Partition of North-East Africa,” Transafrican Journal of History 1, 2 (1971), 23–42; Sven Rubenson, The 
Survival of Ethiopian Independence (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 1976), 378; Muhammad 
Sa‘id al-Gaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, Dirasa fi-l-Siyasa al-Dahiliyya wa-l-Harijiyya li-Dawlat al-
Mahdiyya, 1881–1898 (Beirut: Dar al-Jil, 1992); Richard A. Caulk, “Between the Jaws of Hyenas”: A 
Diplomatic History of Ethiopia (1876–1896) (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2002). 
2 Donald Donham and Wendy James, eds., The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia: Essays in 
History and Social Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).  
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Blue Nile.3 Subjected to Mahdist influences in the early 1880s, this area was later 
incorporated into the Ethiopian empire.4 To the north, the border zone spreading from the 
Atbara River to the Rahad tributary of the Blue Nile was not affected by such a drastic 
political redefinition. It was nevertheless a main battleground for ideological and military 
ambitions opposing the Mahdist state against Christian Ethiopia, which culminated in 
1885–1889. The armed confrontation ended with the death of Emperor Yohannes IV at the 
battle of Gallabat (9–11 March 1889). That same year, the accession of Menilek to the 
Ethiopian throne coincided with the end of the Mahdiyya’s “militant phase.”5 
Notwithstanding heated religious discourses used by both sides as rhetorical 
instruments of legitimization6, the conflict did not hinder intense exchanges across an 
invisible “border.” In this article, I analyze the ways in which people, things, and 
representations circulated between two African states that remained independent at a time 
of growing European hegemony in the world. Although Sudanese-Ethiopian relations were 
to some extent influenced by European imperialist processes, their territories were not 
separated by a European-drawn line.7 Using as primary sources Mahdist archives and 
                                                
3 Alessandro Triulzi, Salt, Gold, and Legitimacy: Prelude to the History of a No-Man’s Land, Belā 
Shangul, Wallaggā, Ethiopia (ca. 1800–1898) (Naples: Instituto Universitario Orientale, 1981). See also his 
article “Trade, Islam, and the Mahdia in Northwestern Wallaggā, Ethiopia,” Journal of African History 16, 1 
(1975), 55–71. 
4 For a contemporary account of borderlands south of the Blue Nile, see Juan Maria Schuver, Juan 
Maria Schuver’s Travels in North East Africa, 1880–1883, ed. Wendy James, Gerd Baumann and Douglas 
H. Johnson (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1996). 
5 Gabriel R. Warburg, Islam, Sectarianism and Politics in the Sudan since the Mahdiyya (London: C. 
Hurst, 2002), 48. The term “Mahdiyya” refers to the political and religious revolutionary movement initiated 
by Muhammad Ahmad b. ‘Abdallah in Sudan in 1881. This self-proclaimed Mahdi (“guided one” in Arabic) 
managed to overthrow the Turco-Egyptian government (January 1885) and establish an Islamic state in most 
of present-day Sudan. After his death (June 1885), he was succeeded by ‘Abdullahi al-Ta‘aishi, widely 
known as Khalifa ‘Abdullahi, who ruled the Mahdist state until its collapse at the hands of Anglo-Egyptian 
troops (September 1898). In the 1890s, Sudanese-Ethiopian relations improved until a peace agreement was 
reached in early 1897. See Balanbras Bozna Venis Balezla Governor of Jelga to En Nur Salaa, early Jumada 
al-Ula 1312/November 1894, MAHDIA 1/34/10B, NRO; Betwadded Mangasha to the Khalifa of the Mahdi, 6 
Safar 1314/17 July 1896, MAHDIA 1/34/10B, NRO; Statement of Mohammed Osman El Haj Khaled, n.d., 
MAHDIA 1/34/16, NRO; Sanderson, “Conflict and Co-operation,” 26, 28–37. 
6 See Iris Seri-Hersch, “Confronting a Christian Neighbor: Sudanese Representations of Ethiopia in the 
Early Mahdist Period, 1885–89,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 41, 2 (2009), 247–67. 
7 The present-day border between Sudan and Ethiopia was delimited on 15 May 1902 by a British-
Ethiopian treaty. See al-Bukhari ‘Abdallah al-Ja‘ali, Hudud al-Sudan al-Sharqiyya ma‘a Ithiubia wa Eritrea: 
al-Niza‘ al-Hududi wa-l-Markaz al-Qanuni (Doha: Matabi‘ al-Bakir, 2000), 81–83. Recent historical studies 
dealing with Africa from a transboundary perspective often situate their analysis in a colonial or postcolonial 
context. Boundaries “arbitrarily” traced by European powers in the late nineteenth century determine the 
spatial configuration in which cross-border activities are examined. See for example, Donna K. Flynn, “‘We 
Are the Border’: Identity, Exchange, and the State along the Bénin-Nigeria Border,” American Ethnologist 
24, 2 (May 1997), 311–30; Tilman Dedering, “War and Mobility in the Borderlands of South Western Africa 
in the Early Twentieth Century,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 39, 2 (2006), 275–94. A 
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accounts of foreigners that traveled or lived in Sudan or Ethiopia in the late 1880s, I 
explore Sudanese-Ethiopian relations through multiple interactions involving both state 
agents and local populations.8 
 
 
Map 1.  Adapted from Peter P. Garretson, “Frontier Feudalism in Northwest Ethiopia: Shaykh al-
Imam ‘Abd Allah of Nuqara, 1901-1923,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 15, 2 
(1982), 262. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
network of scholars interested in African border studies has been established in 2007. See 
http://www.aborne.org. 
8 Primary sources I have consulted for this research inevitably led me to adopt a perspective that is 
more Sudanese/Mahdist than Ethiopian. Further investigations into Ethiopian sources dating from the 1880s 
would greatly contribute to the topic I am dealing with here. 
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Conceptualizing the Border 
The border concept does not bear one single and universal meaning. Although it is 
basically associated with the notion of limit (and thus with otherness), it has acquired 
different meanings in the political jargon according to specific historical and cultural 
contexts. Two major meanings have prevailed in the modern Western world, conveyed by 
the English words border or boundary (line separating two territories or political entities), 
and border or frontier (area considered peripheral in relation to a defined center).9 The 
rather vague French term frontière includes both meanings. Are these concepts relevant or 
applicable to the case of Sudanese-Ethiopian relations in the years 1885–1889? Did 
Mahdist and Ethiopian elites design their political, religious, and economic activities 
according to specific conceptions of border? 
Notions of border that developed in Mahdist Sudan and Ethiopia should be 
considered against the background of the conflict opposing the two countries in the mid-
nineteenth century. In the period of Turco-Egyptian rule over Sudan (1821–1885), no 
separating line delimited the territories of Sudan from those of neighboring Ethiopia. A 
vast no man’s land constituted a buffer zone between the farthest Turco-Egyptian posts and 
regions claimed by local Ethiopian lords.10 In the 1830s, this borderland became a major 
target for slave hunting. Indeed, the Pasha of Egypt asked for an increasing number of 
slaves from Sudan. Functioning as a human reservoir, areas bordering Ethiopia were 
believed to contain legendary mineral resources.11 Such material wealth encouraged the 
Turco-Egyptians to organize several large expeditions in 1837–1838, which resulted in the 
occupation of the town of Gallabat.12 Both the Ethiopians and the European consuls in 
Egypt suspected that Mehmet Ali intended to conquer the whole of Ethiopia. Under British 
pressure, the Turco-Egyptian ruler assured that he only wanted “to establish his authority 
in those peripheral areas inhabited by Muslim tribes (…) the ‘enemies of the Christian 
                                                
9 See Malcolm Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1996), quoted by Dedering, “War and Mobility,” 275. 
10 Harold G. Marcus, “Ethio-British Negotiations Concerning the Western Border with Sudan, 1896–
1902,” Journal of African History 4, 1 (1963), 90; Mordechai Abir, “The Origins of the Ethiopian-Egyptian 
Border Problem in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of African History 8, 3 (1967), 447. 
11 Abir, “The Origins,” 451. 
12 Gallabat is referred to as “Metemma” in certain Ethiopian and European sources. In the 1860s, the 
French traveler Guillaume Lejean used “Gallabat” to designate both the local district and its capital. He 
explained that “metamma” was a generic term referring to the ruler’s place of residence. Thus, he also related 
to the town as “Metamma.” The area was also traditionally called Ras al-Fil (“head of the elephant” in 
Arabic), a name used by James Bruce, who traveled in the region in 1772. See Guillaume Marie Lejean, 
Voyage aux deux Nils: Nubie Kordofan, Soudan oriental: exécuté de 1860 à 1864 (Paris: Hachette, 1865), 
127–133. Online at Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Gallica, http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k852382. 
image.f4.langFR (6 May 2009). Although “Gallabat” and “Metemma” are often interchangeably used to 
designate the border town, al-Gaddal points out that they were two distinct but adjacent towns. See al-
Gaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 14. However, al-Gaddal does not specify the period to which he relates. 
There may have been a single town in the borderlands until the Mahdist period or the early Condominium 
era. 
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tribes of the interior.’”13 The historian Mordechai Abir explains these tensions by the 
difference between Egyptian and Ethiopian conceptions of the border. Influenced by 
European ideas, the Turco-Egyptians defined a territory as theirs according to two 
important criteria: the religion of its inhabitants (Islam) and the effective administration of 
this territory. Mehmet Ali followed the principle of effective occupation, which later 
became the main legitimizing tool for Africa’s territorial division among European 
powers.14 For their part, the Ethiopians conceived the border as an undefined zone 
extending into their neighbors’ lands. Effective control of a territory was not a necessary 
condition for its appropriation. Rather, a governor’s ability to organize raids and collect 
taxes in an area made it part of the Ethiopian territory.15 The legacy of this first Egyptian-
Ethiopian (military and conceptual) confrontation was the absence of a clearly defined 
linear and uncontested border. The borderlands remained a kind of no man’s land inhabited 
by ethnically and religiously heterogeneous populations. It alternatively served as a refuge 
and a hideaway for rebels and bandits from both sides.16 
Egyptian and Ethiopian interests clashed again during the reign of Khedive Ismail 
(1863–1879), who sought to build a large empire in northeastern Africa. Emperor 
Yohannes IV (1872–1889) attempted to neutralize Egyptian expansionism by borrowing 
the European concept of border. Some time before the battles of Gundat (1875) and Gura 
(1876), Yohannes told his host De Sarzec, the French consul at Massawa: 
Egypt covets my country; she surrounds me from all sides. Until this day, I have 
not wanted to forcefully oppose these invasions. I call on the Western nations. [I 
call] the Christian sovereigns of Europe, whom I ask their support, to agree on 
sending wise and upright men, disinterested arbitrators, who will settle between 
Ismail-Pasha and me. They will delimit our respective borders. What they do will 
be well done, and I commit myself not to transgress the limits that they draw for 
me.17 
The emperor’s words are interesting on several grounds. First, they show his 
willingness to solve the conflict through an external, European and disinterested 
intervention. Could rulers that he himself qualifies as “Christians” play the role of 
impartial judges in a struggle between Ottoman/Muslim Egypt and Christian Ethiopia? 
                                                
13 Abir, “The Origins,” 453. 
14 Ibid., 460. 
15 Haggai Erlich, Ethiopia and the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 47. According to 
Donham, the idea of delimited borders and fixed territories slowly integrated the political culture of imperial 
Ethiopia in the early twentieth century. See Donald Donham, “Old Abyssinia and the New Ethiopian Empire: 
Themes in Social History,” in Donham and James, The Southern Marches, 42. 
16 Lejean, Voyage aux deux Nils, 129, 133; Abir, “The Origins,” 460; Peter P. Garretson, “Vicious 
Cycles: Ivory, Slaves, and Arms on the New Maji Frontier,” in Donham and James, The Southern Marches, 
196. 
17 Achille Raffray, Abyssinie (Paris: Plon, 1876), quoted by Jean-Baptiste Coulbeaux, Histoire 
politique et religieuse de l’Abyssinie : Depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu’à l’avènement de Ménélick II 
(Paris: P. Geuthner, 1929), II, 472. My translation and emphasis. 
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Second, the emperor invoked the European concept of border as the solution to the 
conflict. In this sense, the border was a line meant to limit and contain each state within a 
defined space. However, Yohannes’ wish for European intervention was not fulfilled, and 
the border as a precise and linear concept remained a theoretical notion. 
In the mid-1880s, tensions grew between Ethiopia and Italy while relations with 
Mahdist Sudan deteriorated. Gerald Portal, a British emissary commissioned to mediate 
between Ethiopia and Italy, presented Yohannes with the conditions he should accept in 
order to establish friendly relations with the King of Italy. Among them was the obligation 
to mark out the Ethiopian border with pillars erected at regular intervals, “in order to 
prevent any further dispute in the future.”18 With British support, Italy apparently tried to 
impose upon Yohannes the European concept of border in the sense of a physically visible 
line, something that did not suit the emperor’s immediate interests.19 
How was the border conceptualized in the framework of Sudanese-Ethiopian 
relations, which were particularly tense from 1885 till 1889? The sources I have used 
include only one document that specifically refers to the Ethiopian emperor’s position on 
this matter. It consists of a peace proposal that he sent to the Mahdist emir in charge of the 
Gallabat region, Hamdan Abu ‘Anja. Stressing the uselessness of wars, the emperor 
addressed the Sudanese rulers in the following way: “Let us then both remain—each in his 
country within his own limits and let us not kill the poor and harmless without cause, but 
let us both unite against our common enemies—the Europeans.”20 Even if the border did 
not correspond to a line known and accepted by all, it referred to a sufficiently precise 
concept requiring the armies of each state to stay in their respective territory. The manner 
in which Yohannes conceived inter-state peace implied the notion of respecting borders, a 
fundamental element in modern international relations.21 
On the Sudanese side, the Mahdist chronicler Ismail b. ‘Abd al-Qadir presented the 
border as a theological rather than geographical concept. His book about the Sudanese-
Ethiopian conflict contains no mention of the physical position of what he considered to be 
the border of either the Mahdiyya or Ethiopia. ‘Abd al-Qadir justified the militant attitude 
of the Mahdists toward their Christian neighbors by accusing the latter of having 
                                                
18 Gerald H. Portal, My Mission to Abyssinia (London: E. Arnold, 1892), 168. 
19 The definition of Ethiopian territories and Italian zones of occupation was itself at the center of the 
Ethio-Italian dispute. For more details, see Ibid., 158; Harold G. Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik II: 
Ethiopia 1844–1913 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 98. 
20 John King of Zion to Hamdan Abu ‘Anja, 17 Kihak 1881 / 25 December 1888, MAHDIA 1/34/1/192, 
NRO. 
21 Yohannes’ successor, Emperor Menilek II (1889–1913), would play the “game of effective 
occupation” a decade later, in the face of British advance towards Sudan and French progression into the 
Upper Nile Basin. See Triulzi, Salt, Gold, and Legitimacy, 178, and Douglas H. Johnson, “On the Nilotic 
Frontier: Imperial Ethiopia in the Southern Sudan, 1898–1936,” in Donham and James, The Southern 
Marches, 220. For a political and judicial analysis of border problems between Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea 
since the late nineteenth century, see al-Ja‘ali, Hudud al-Sudan. 
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“transgressed the borders [hudud] and not let the people of Islam in peace.”22 The 
Ethiopian entity is thus delimited by borders that have religious and “behavioral” meaning. 
Endre Stiansen and Michael Kevane have suggested an interesting interpretation for 
Mahdist conceptualizations of the border, although it is not necessarily convincing. They 
claim that in opposition to their Turco-Egyptian predecessors, the Mahdists “felt the need 
to establish their monopoly of power within defined borders.”23 This hypothesis is 
bolstered by the example of the repression of the jihadiyya revolt that erupted in 1885 in 
the Nuba Mountains. The Mahdi could not tolerate the existence of dissident fiefs within 
the new Islamic community he strove to build. The idea of a political and religious 
monopoly does not seem unfounded, but did the consolidation of such an incontestable 
power automatically entail the existence of precise geographical borders? Nothing is less 
certain. In practice, the Mahdist elite could draw a clear distinction between the Mahdiyya 
and the rest of the world while accommodating with moving “physical” borders. Alan B. 
Theobald’s assertion that “the boundary [between the Mahdist state and Ethiopia] was 
clearly marked geographically and racially,”24 is not supported by any evidence. 
In the early Mahdist period, the border concept took different shapes in the 
discourses of Ethiopian and Sudanese political figures. While Emperor Yohannes 
sometimes resorted to the European notion of a defined and defining line, Sudanese leaders 
tended to espouse a religious distinction. In practice, the borderlands retained some long-
lasting features: they were territories inhabited by various cultural and religious groups, 
crossed by several important commercial routes, attracting individuals who distanced 
themselves from the central state for a variety of political, religious, and economic 
motives. 
Commercial Trends Between Official Ideology and Pragmatic Needs 
During the second half of the 1880s, the circulation of goods and people between Sudan 
and Ethiopia followed two different patterns: negotiation and consensus on the one hand, 
constraint and the use of force on the other. Commercial exchanges and war booty 
represented two distinct modes, although complementary in certain cases, for acquiring 
vital products (cattle, foodstuffs) and more luxurious items (slaves, gold, ivory). I shall 
examine each of these two modes separately, and then elaborate on a phenomenon that is 
closely connected to both of them: slavery and the slave trade. 
Borderlands located between the towns of Gedaref, Gallabat (Sudan) and Gondar 
(Ethiopia) constituted a zone of intense commercial exchanges well before the Mahdist 
                                                
22 Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim and Muhammad Sa‘id al-Gaddal, eds., Al-Harb al-Habashiyya al-
Sudaniyya: 1885–1888 (Beirut: Dar al-Jil, 1991), critical edition of Ismail ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Kurdufani, Al-
Tiraz al-Manqush bi-Bushra Qatl Yuhanna Malik al-Hubush (Omdurman: handwritten manuscript by the 
katib Muhammad Ahmad Hashim, 1890, conserved at the Sudan Archive, Durham, SAD 99/7), 59. My 
translation. 
23 Endre Stiansen and Michael Kevane, Kordofan Invaded: Peripheral Incorporation and Social 
Transformation in Islamic Africa (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 25. 
24 Alan B. Theobald, The Mahdiya: A History of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1881–1899 (1951; reprint, 
London: Longmans, 1962), 150. 
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period. Under Turco-Egyptian rule, these towns were meeting points not only for local 
merchants, but also for traders coming from Egypt, the Hijaz, India, Greece and 
Armenia.25 Located near productive agricultural land, Gedaref became an important 
regional market. Its natural protection (the town was surrounded by hills) and its central 
position in the middle of a triangle formed by the towns of Kassala, Abu Haraz, and 
Gallabat contributed to the dynamism of its commercial activities. In addition to crops 
such as maize, sorghum, sesame, and grapes, Gedaref became famous for its cattle and 
ostrich feathers trade, as well as for its soap and tobacco production.26 In April 1881, 
Schuver recorded that cotton from Gedaref and Doka (a village located between Gedaref 
and Gallabat) was exported to Ethiopia through Metemma and Gondar.27 Turco-Egyptian 
governors were not blind to this prosperity, which benefited them through taxes levied on 
local products. 
Unlike Gedaref, the town of Gallabat was the focus of long quarrels between the 
Turco-Egyptian and Ethiopian governments. Its geographical position made it into a 
disputed border zone. A military outpost under the Sultanate of Funj (1504–1821), it came 
under Ethiopian control in 1821 and was then occupied by Turco-Egyptian forces (1838). 
It remained subordinate to Khartoum until its evacuation in early 1885, when the Mahdists 
took possession of the town.28 The market of Gallabat was among the largest ones in 
Sudan; people came there to negotiate various products such as cattle, cotton, wax, musk, 
coffee, oil, slaves, gold, and ivory.29 This may explain the demographic significance of the 
Gallabat district, which numbered 25,000 persons in 1864, whereas Khartoum numbered 
no more than 30,000 people at the same time.30 The town’s commercial activities brought 
great profits to the polity that controlled it, a fact that accounts for several episodes of 
conflict between the Turco-Egyptian and Ethiopian regimes (in 1838 and 1863). The role 
of Gallabat’s Takarir31 community as commercial intermediaries between Sudan and 
Ethiopia should be emphasized. The Takarir levied taxes on goods for the benefit of one 
                                                
25 Al-Gaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 14, 16; Sadiq Basha al-Mu’ayyad al-‘Azm, Rihlat al-
Habasha: min al-Asitana ila Adis Ababa, 1896 (1904; reprint, Abu Dhabi: Dar al-Suwaydi, 2001), 168. 
26 Joseph Ohrwalder, Aufstand und Reich des Mahdi im Sudan und meine zehnjährige Gefangenschaft 
dortselbst (Innsbruck: H. Schwick, 1892), 156; al-Gaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 14. 
27 Schuver, Juan Maria Schuver’s Travels, 278. 
28 Implementing the Hewett Treaty signed with Britain on 3 June 1884, Ethiopian soldiers helped to 
evacuate Turco-Egyptian troops assailed by Mahdist forces in the Sudanese-Ethiopian borderlands. 
29 Al-Gaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 16. 
30 Ibid; Lejean, Voyage aux deux Nils, 128. 
31 The term Takrur refers to the capital of a state that emerged in the Senegal Valley in the eleventh 
century. It is believed to be the first West African principality that adopted Islam. The attributive form 
(nisba)—Takruri, pl. Takarir—came to be used in the Middle East to name Muslims from West Africa that 
had gone on pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj). The Takarir mentioned here settled in the Gallabat region in the 
eighteenth century, after returning from Mecca. For more details, see ‘Umar al-Naqar, “Takrur, the History 
of a Name,” Journal of African History 10, 3 (1969), 365–74, and also Schuver, Juan Maria Schuver’s 
Travels, 13 n. 2. 
“Transborder” Exchanges of People, Things, and Representations     9 
 
government or the other. Their political allegiance indeed oscillated between Sudan and 
Ethiopia, according to changing power relations between the two states.32 
Gondar, the imperial capital of Ethiopia from 1636 to 1855, was located at the 
crossroads of several important commercial routes. One axis linked it to Egypt through 
Sennar and Nubia. A second started in Darfur in the west and reached the port of Massawa 
in the east, passing through Sennar, Gondar, and Adwa. A third route led traders from 
Gondar to Gallabat.33 The imperial city was among the largest markets of Ethiopia during 
the first half of the nineteenth century. Commercial activities persisted even when Gondar 
lost its imperial status under the rule of Tewodros II (1855–1868). The city was especially 
reputed for its gold, coffee, and ivory markets, but the selling of cattle and poultry was 
equally widespread. In the mind of many inhabitants of Sudan, Gondar represented an 
incredibly prosperous city beyond the borderlands. 
Were such commercial dynamics maintained in the Mahdist period? One would 
tend to answer negatively when considering the fact that both the Mahdi and the Khalifa 
“refused to establish diplomatic and commercial contacts with neighboring Muslim states 
that did not accept [the Mahdist] mission.”34 If even Muslim states such as Egypt could not 
hope to soften the Mahdist elite’s intransigency, where did Christian Ethiopia stand? In 
respect to Egyptian traders, the Khalifa forbade them access to the Mahdist territories in a 
letter he wrote in 1886 or 1887: 
The region from which you now come is under the government of the unbelievers 
and it is not right that there should be a connection between its people and the 
people of a country under the government of the Mahdia. Your coming is only for 
the sake of trade so in the best interests of the Faith, We have thought it most 
expedient that there should be no sale in the Sudan of the goods you have 
brought.35 
Beyond his religious ideology, the Khalifa may have feared the impact of Egyptian 
influences capable of undermining the legitimacy of the Mahdist state. His attitude is 
confirmed by a letter addressed to the inhabitants of Italian-occupied Massawa on 
December 6, 1887. The author, a Mahdist commander named Muhammad ‘Ali Farja b. 
‘Uthman, complained about the fact that the area stretching between his post and Massawa 
(present-day Western Eritrea) was merely a place for commercial transactions and “other 
worldly business.” Although part of the population of Massawa had embraced the 
Mahdiyya, religious zeal did not seem to preoccupy them. Therefore, Muhammad ‘Ali 
justified the Khalifa’s decision to prevent all traders from accessing the roads leading to 
Massawa, Suakin, and Egypt. Those violating the rule would have their goods 
                                                
32 Lejean, Voyage aux deux Nils, 129–30; al-Gaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 13. 
33 Al-Gaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 17–18. 
34 Ahmad Ibrahim AbuShouk, “Ideology versus Pragmatism—the Case of the Mahdist Public Treasury 
in the Sudan (1881–1898),” Die Welt des Islams 46, 2 (2006), 159. 
35 MAHDIA 2/31/4/112, NRO, quoted by Peter M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881–1898: A 
Study of Its Origins Development and Overthrow (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 236–37. 
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confiscated.36 By minimizing contacts between Mahdist Sudan and its immediate 
neighbors, the Khalifa plausibly attempted to reduce both the possibilities of escape from 
Sudan and the penetration of “harmful” influences from neighboring areas.37 The 
commercial policy of the Mahdist ruler was nevertheless flexible. After the total 
destruction of Mahdist forces by Anglo-Egyptian troops at the battle of Tushki (August 3, 
1889) and a drought that ravaged the country in 1889–1890, he opened Sudan to foreign 
merchants coming from the north and the east. Recommended by the treasurer of the 
Mahdist state (Ibrahim ‘Adlan), this change included a state monopoly on trade in ivory, 
Arabic gum, and ostrich feathers.38 
This trend in Mahdist commercial policy seemingly did not apply to trade with 
Ethiopia. Various sources indeed mention the existence of intensive commercial activities 
in the border zone of Gallabat, even at a time of growing tensions between the two 
neighboring states. Al-‘Azm states that Mahdist Emir Yunis al-Dikaym, after he settled in 
Gallabat in March–April 1887, proclaimed the freedom of trade for all merchants.39 Abu 
Salim and al-Gaddal go further when they argue that commercial exchanges did not suffer 
at all from military operations affecting the borderlands. Al-Dikaym considered the 
Ethiopian traders—niqadiyya—as people who practiced a lawful occupation that should 
not be curtailed.40 The Khalifa himself had supposedly authorized them to pursue their 
activities. 
However, one incident tarnishes this somewhat idealized picture. About one month 
after his appointment as governor of the Gallabat district, al-Dikaym arrested a caravan 
including 402 Ethiopian and Jabarti merchants.41 Goods were confiscated and men were 
                                                
36 Muhammad ‘Ali Farja b. ‘Uthman to the People of Massawa, 20 Rabi‘ al-Awwal 1305 / 6 December 
1887, MAHDIA 1/34/16A/47, NRO. 
37 According to Carl Neufeld, a German prisoner of the Mahdists from 1887 till 1899, “The Caliph 
indeed wanted to keep Sudan as much a terra incognita as possible; he feared that the opening of new trade 
routes would open the way into the country” [my translation]. Carl Neufeld, In Ketten des Kalifen: Zwölf 
Jahre Gefangenschaft in Omdurman (Berlin, Stuttgart: W. Spemann, 1899), 164. For numbers showing a 
significant diminution of Sudanese imports and exports between 1882 and 1888, see Henry Russell, The Ruin 
of the Soudan: Cause, Effect and Remedy. A Résumé of Events, 1883–1891 (London: Sampson, Low and 
Marston, 1892), 288–99. Like other European publications at that time, Russell’s book nourished anti-
Mahdist feelings concomitant with British strategic interests in the Nile Valley; therefore these numbers 
should be considered with particular caution. 
38 AbuShouk, “Ideology versus Pragmatism,” 160. 
39 Al-‘Azm, Rihlat al-Habasha, 170. 
40 Abu Salim and al-Gaddal, eds., Al-Harb al-Habashiyya al-Sudaniyya, 60 n. 1. By contrast the 
historian Peter Garretson links military raids to declining trade in the area during the Mahdist period. See 
Peter Garretson, “The Naggadras, Trade, and Selected Towns in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century 
Ethiopia,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 12, 3 (1979), 435. 
41 Abu Salim and al-Gaddal, eds., Al-Harb al-Habashiyya al-Sudaniyya, 60 n. 2; Holt, The Mahdist 
State, 151. Jabara or Jabart originally refers to a region near Zeila, to the east of Shoa, where early Muslim 
migrants established a community. It later came to apply to all Muslims inhabiting the Ethiopian highlands. 
For various etymologies of the term, see Abdulkader Saleh, “Ǧäbärti” in Encyclopaedia Aethiopica 
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put in chains and sent to the Mahdist capital of Omdurman. The emir justified his act by 
accusing the Muslim merchants of paying taxes to Ethiopia and failing to fulfill prayer 
duties. The motives underlying this action could plausibly be connected to al-Dikaym’s 
political and military ambitions. He purposefully sought to impress his patron through a 
spectacular move.42 This episode generated two reactions that deserve our attention: first, 
the Khalifa “jihadized” the event by spreading the news of al-Dikaym’s victory against the 
unbelievers, presenting the merchants as authentic war prisoners; second, the chronicler 
‘Abd al-Qadir transformed the event into a matter of espionage, claiming that the 
Ethiopians were actually spies disguised as traders.43 Ideological and political meanings 
were thus used to justify the caravan’s capture. 
When Hamdan Abu ‘Anja came to govern the Gallabat district (December 1887), 
he proclaimed the freedom of trade on one condition: merchants should grant him one fifth 
of their goods.44 This arrangement seems to have satisfied all parties, for many Ethiopian 
traders poured into the town and sold crops, milk products, honey, and oil. The one-fifth 
tax levied on these commodities served to maintain Abu ‘Anja’s army.45 
War Booty: the Material and Symbolic Functions of a Shared Practice 
Negotiation was not the only mechanism allowing goods and people to flow across the 
borderlands. Another pattern of movement involved physical violence and constraint. War 
booty constituted a central tool of acquisition for Sudanese and Ethiopian state officials. 
With regards to Sudanese gains, Hamdan Abu ‘Anja’s victorious campaign in Dembea and 
Gondar (January 1888) resulted in the taking of peculiarly large amounts of booty.46 A few 
                                                                                                                                              
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2005), 2: 597–98; Edward Ullendorff, “Djabart” in Encyclopédie de l’Islam 
(Leiden: Brill, and Paris: Maisonneuve and Larose, 1965), 2: 364–65. See also John S. Trimingham, Islam in 
Ethiopia (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 58; Mordechai Abir, “The Ethiopian Slave Trade and Its 
Relation to the Islamic World,” in John R. Willis, ed., Slaves and Slavery in Muslim Africa. Vol. 2: The 
Servile Estate (London: F. Cass, 1985), 135 n. 7; Hussein Ahmed, Islam in Nineteenth-Century Wallo, 
Ethiopia: Revival, Reform, and Reaction (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 205. 
42 Abu Salim and al-Gaddal, eds., Al-Harb al-Habashiyya al-Sudaniyya, 60 n. 2; al-Gaddal, Al-
Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 72; al-‘Azm, Rihlat al-Habasha, 171. 
43 Abu Salim and al-Gaddal, eds., Al-Harb al-Habashiyya al-Sudaniyya, 59. 
44 Al-‘Azm, Rihlat al-Habasha, 172. It is interesting to notice that the Islamic canonical rule regulating 
the distribution of war booty (ghanima) was transposed to trade. See AbuShouk, “Ideology versus 
Pragmatism,” 156. 
45 Al-‘Azm, Rihlat al-Habasha, 172. 
46 This expedition constituted the furthest Mahdist territorial expansion into Ethiopia (Abu Salim and 
al-Gaddal, eds., Al-Harb al-Habashiyya al-Sudaniyya, 15–16); it may have involved the biggest army 
invading Ethiopia in the nineteenth century (Richard A. Caulk, “Firearms and Princely Power in Ethiopia in 
the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of African History 13, 4 (1972), 622). An Egyptian Military intelligence 
report mentions “70,000 [Mahdist] men with 7,000 rifles” (“War between Dervishes and Abyssinians,” 
undated, CAIRINT 1/29/148, NRO), whereas Tsegaye Tegenu gives the number of 19,000 Mahdist troops: 
Tsegaye Tegenu, The Evolution of Ethiopian Absolutism: The Genesis and the Making of the Fiscal Military 
State, 1696–1913 (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1996), 262. 
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days after the destruction of the ancient Ethiopian capital and its numerous churches, the 
Mahdist emir wrote a letter mentioning the amount of booty, its nature and distribution, as 
well as the number of killed and injured Mahdists. The booty was divided into four 
categories: horses, mules, donkeys, and slaves. For each category, Abu ‘Anja detailed the 
total number of captured elements, one fifth of this number (tanzil ‘an al-khums), and the 
remaining amount, which had to be granted to the army (haqq al-jaysh). For instance, 
3,445 slaves were taken in total, of whom 684 were due to the Khalifa and 2,761 to the 
fighters.47 A total of 3,647 donkeys, 447 horses, and 326 mules were captured, of which 
one fifth was set aside for the Khalifa. The booty also included clothes of Ethiopian 
leaders, some of which were adorned with silver and red gems.48 
Abu ‘Anja’s report shows that Islamic canonical law regarding the distribution of 
ghanima49—four fifths to the fighters and one fifth to the state ruler—was respected in this 
major campaign. Did Mahdist policies generally stick to this rule? 
Muhammad Ahmad applied these regulations during the early years of his struggle 
against Turco-Egyptian power. However, he later adopted a new approach that allowed 
him to grant the entire booty to the treasury (bayt al-mal).50 His successor, Khalifa 
‘Abdullahi, introduced significant changes in the organization of state finances. He 
transformed bayt al-mal into bayt al-mal al-’umumi (public treasury) and reduced its 
importance by creating several parallel treasuries: bayt mal al-mulazimiyya (treasury of his 
personal guard), bayt mal warshat al-harbiyya wa-l-tirsana (arsenal and dockyard 
treasury), bayt mal dabitiyyat al-suq (market police treasury) and bayt mal khums al-
khalifa (treasury of the Khalifa’s fifth).51 In the account of Rudolf Carl Slatin, a famous 
Austrian prisoner of the Mahdists, war booty appears only in the Khalifa’s personal 
treasury. It seems, therefore, that one fifth of all war booty was usually put to the ruler’s 
                                                
47 Hamdan Abu ‘Anja to Khalifa, 15 Jumada al-Ula 1305 / 29 January 1888, MAHDIA 1/34/16B/67, 
NRO. 
48 Ibid. 
49 The Arabic word for booty and an Islamic notion defined as “weapons, horses, prisoners of war, and 
all other movable possessions taken in battle from unbelievers.” See AbuShouk, “Ideology versus 
Pragmatism,” 156. 
50 Ibid.; Yitzhak Nakash, “Fiscal and Monetary Systems in the Mahdist Sudan, 1881–1898,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 20, 3 (1988), 379; Ahmad Ibrahim AbuShouk and Anders 
Bjørkelo, The Public Treasury of the Muslims: Monthly Budgets of the Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1897 
(New York: Brill, 1996), 27; Muhammad Ibrahim Naqd, ‘Alaqat al-Riqq fi-l-Mujtama‘ al-Sudani: Tawthiq 
wa-Ta‘liq (Khartoum: Dar ‘Azza li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi‘, 2003), 93. One reason underlying the Mahdi’s 
decision is the inflation process resulting from the great quantity of booty taken by the Mahdists from Turco-
Egyptian troops (gold, jewelry, coins). 
51 AbuShouk, “Ideology versus Pragmatism,” 155; Rudolf Slatin Pascha, Feuer und Schwert im Sudan: 
Meine Kämpfe mit den Derwischen, meine Gefangenschaft und Flucht, 1879–1895 (German original edition, 
Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1922 [1896¹]), 2: 231–34; Holt, The Mahdist State, 238–41; Nakash, “Fiscal and 
Monetary Systems,” 371; Muhammad Sa‘id al-Gaddal, Al-Siyasa al-Iqtisadiyya li-l-Dawla al-Mahdiyya: 
Masadiruha, Mazahiruha, Tatbiquha 1881–1898 (Beirut: Dar al-Jil, 1992) quoted in Warburg, Islam, 
Sectarianism and Politics in the Sudan, 55. 
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personal use. Neufeld even extended the Khalifa’s revenues to one fifth of total assets in 
Sudan, because “all property was considered to be under his supreme management.”52 
Even if the rule was well defined in theory (one fifth of the booty for the head of 
the Mahdist state, four fifths for the soldiers), the distribution of booty did cause tensions 
in practice. Combatants sometimes seized parts of the booty outside the “official” division. 
The Khalifa strove to impose a strict discipline among his troops, calling on them to 
disregard worldly things.53 His position on this issue can be inferred from a letter written 
to him by an officer enrolled in Emir al-Dikaym’s army: 
I shall do all my duties with the greatest firmness, and fight the enemy without 
cowardice (…) I will never take anything of the booty, not even a needle (…) Our 
men and I, after knowing what has happened [among soldiers of other armed units], 
have sworn to God, His Prophet, His Mahdi, and to you, that we attend always the 
five prayers, the rateb of the Mahdi (…), the reading of the Koran, morning and 
evening in parties, and not to run away before the enemy, but either to gain the 
victory for religion, or die in its cause, also that we will never hide any booty, not 
even a needle; we have definitely discarded this world and are ready to fight in the 
cause of religion until we meet God (…).54 
This letter alludes to troubles that occurred within several units of the Mahdist army, 
whose soldiers allegedly took illegal parts of the booty. 
Ethiopian officers and soldiers also benefited from large quantities of booty taken 
in expeditions and raids in the border zone. In January 1887, Takla Haimanot, the 
Ethiopian governor of Gojjam, conducted an attack on the town of Gallabat. The Ethiopian 
force, which may have been as much as ten times larger than the local Mahdist garrison, 
“occupied Gallabat, set it on fire, and plundered all the money and material goods [that 
could be found] in the town.”55 South of the Blue Nile, Ras Gobana, a general who greatly 
contributed to Shoan expansion into southwestern Ethiopia in the 1880s, led successful 
campaigns against Mahdists in western Wallagga. During one of those expeditions, which 
                                                
52 Neufeld, In Ketten des Kalifen, 232. My translation. Regarding booty from the Sudanese province of 
Kordofan, of which one fifth was sent to Omdurman, see David F. Decker, “Females and the State in 
Mahdist Kordofan,” in Stiansen and Kevane, Kordofan Invaded, 91. Holt stresses that the one fifth fraction 
need not be taken literally; Holt, The Mahdist State, 239. 
53 Naqd, ‘Alaqat al-Riqq, 93. 
54 Uthman Maati to the Khalifa, 22 Shawwal 1304 / 14 July 1887, MAHDIA 1/34/16A/71, NRO. The 
ratib was a prayer book compiled by the Mahdi, which his followers had to recite on a daily basis. 
55 Al-Gaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 59. My translation. Al-Gaddal mentions the “exaggerated” 
numbers of Slatin regarding the size of the two armies: 60,000 Ethiopian warriors against 6,000 Mahdist 
soldiers. Tegenu refers to even larger numbers: 100,000 Ethiopians against 16,000 Mahdists (The Evolution 
of Ethiopian Absolutism, 262). Thousands of Mahdists perished, including their leader Muhammad walad 
Arbab. Egyptian Military Intelligence reported as many as 20,000 Mahdist men killed in the assault. See 
“War between Dervishes and Abyssinians,” undated, CAIRINT 1/29/148, NRO. 
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occurred in 1886 or 1888, the Ethiopian force killed 5,000 Mahdists and captured 1,325 
firearms.56 
The profits of war booty were certainly not the privilege of state officials. Outlaws 
and bandits inhabiting the border zone naturally engaged in plunder and brigandage 
activities, which contributed to the movement of objects, animals, and people across the 
borderlands. I shall return to this topic in a later section of this paper.57 
Beyond the satisfaction of material needs, booty also fulfilled a highly symbolic 
function. Particularly striking is the case of Ethiopian heads that were cut off and sent to 
Omdurman. The Khalifa exhibited the heads of his “internal” and “external” enemies 
throughout the Mahdist capital. Among “internal” opponents who underwent this cruel 
treatment, we find Shaykh Salih of the Kababish tribe (May 1887),58 Adam Muhammad 
and his disciples,59 as well as the Sultan of Darfur Yusuf Ibrahim (January or March 
1888).60 Joseph Ohrwalder61 has depicted this practice in greater detail than any other 
witness of the Mahdist period. According to his account, Abu ‘Anja’s campaign to 
Dembea and Gondar resulted in the dispatch of twelve Ethiopian heads to Omdurman. At 
the battle of Gallabat (9 March, 1889), whose outcome was brutally reversed by Yohannes 
                                                
56 Triulzi, Salt, Gold, and Legitimacy, 160, 166. 
57 The sheftenat (Amharic word for banditry/rebellion) phenomenon in nineteenth- and twentieth-
century Ethiopia has drawn a great deal of scholarly attention in the 1980s. See Richard Caulk, “Bad Men of 
the Borders: Shum and Shefta in Northern Ethiopia in the 19th century,” International Journal of African 
Historical Studies 17, 2 (1984), 201–27; Donald Crummey, “Banditry and Resistance: Noble and Peasant in 
Nineteenth-Century Ethiopia,” in Donald Crummey, ed., Banditry, Rebellion, and Social Protest in Africa 
(London: J. Currey, 1986), 133–49; in the same volume, Timothy Fernyhough, “Social Mobility and 
Dissident Elites in Northern Ethiopia: The Role of Bandits, 1900–1969,” 151–72; Peter P. Garretson, 
“Frontier Feudalism in Northwest Ethiopia: Shaykh al-Imam ‘Abd Allah of Nuqara, 1901–1923,” 
International Journal of African Historical Studies 15, 2 (1982), 261–82. 
58 Francis R. Wingate, Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan: Being an Account of the Rise and Progress 
of Mahdiism, and of Subsequent Events in the Sudan to the Present Time (1891; reprint, London: F. Cass, 
1968), 339. 
59 In late 1887, a man called Adam Muhammad claimed to be the prophet Jesus and managed to gather 
many followers among resentful Mahdist soldiers posted at Gallabat. Emir Abu ‘Anja reported the event to 
the Khalifa, who had the conspirators executed (December 1887). See Wingate, Mahdiism, 334–35; Na‘um 
Shuqayr, Ta’rikh al-Sudan al-Qadim wa-l-Hadith wa-Jughrafiyatuhu (Cairo: n.p., 1903) edited by 
Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim, Ta’rikh al-Sudan (Beirut: Dar al-Jil, 1981), 733–35; Holt, The Mahdist 
State, 152–53. 
60 Ohrwalder, Aufstand und Reich des Mahdi, 170; Holt, The Mahdist State, 138. 
61 Joseph Ohrwalder ( ?–1912) was an Austrian priest of the Roman Catholic mission in Central Africa. 
He went to Cairo in 1880 and traveled to Sudan with Bishop Daniel Comboni. He was stationed at the 
Dilling mission (Nuba Mountains) until his capture by the Mahdists, who took him to El Obeid (1882). He 
was then transferred to Omdurman, where he lived for ten years as the Khalifa’s captive. He succeeded in 
escaping to Egypt in 1892. He came back to Omdurman after the 1898 Anglo-Egyptian “reconquest” and 
died there in 1912. See Richard L. Hill, A Biographical Dictionary of the Sudan (1951; reprint, London: F. 
Cass, 1967), 298. 
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being fatally injured, Mahdist fighters sent several severed Ethiopian heads to the Khalifa 
to convince him of a great Mahdist victory.62 Two days later, the head of Emperor 
Yohannes was brought to Omdurman. Ohrwalder described how the Khalifa sought to 
consolidate his political and religious legitimacy through a ceremonial use of the 
decapitated heads. These were paraded publicly while being attributed to great enemies of 
the Mahdist state, such as Ras Alula, Ras Hayla Maryam, and Salih Shanga.63 Yohannes’ 
head was shown all around the market in order to announce the defeat of the powerful 
emperor. 
Mahdist use of their severed enemies’ heads did not only address the Sudanese 
population; it also aimed at pressuring Egyptian and British enemies. According to 
Ohrwalder, the Khalifa forwarded the Ethiopian emperor’s head to Dongola and Wadi 
Halfa (at the Sudanese-Egyptian border) as a warning signal to the Khedive and the 
British: a similar fate would await them if they failed to submit to the Mahdiyya.64 
Enslaving and Slave Trading Across the Borderlands 
The two modes of circulation that I have examined up to this point—trade and war 
booty—are closely connected to a “total” phenomenon, whose social, political, economic 
and cultural implications are extremely varied, and which has left deep imprints on 
Sudanese and Ethiopian societies: slavery and the slave trade. The Gallabat border zone 
witnessed large-scale flows of objectified men and women during the Mahdist period. Due 
to space limits, I shall briefly point out at a few aspects relevant for our discussion, meant 
to stress the phenomenon’s “qualitative” and “quantitative” significance within the 
appropriate historical context. 
The canonical legal texts of both societies, the Qur’an for Mahdist Sudan and the 
Fetha Nägäst for Christian Ethiopia, recognize the institution of slavery and regulate it in 
specific ways.65 According to the Shari‘a, a person can be legally enslaved if he/she is not 
a Muslim and if he/she has been captured in a jihad.66 The legal code of the Ethiopian 
                                                
62 Ohrwalder, Aufstand und Reich des Mahdi, 179. 
63 In a letter written after the end of the battle, the Mahdist commander al-Zaki Tamal informed the 
Khalifa that the head of Ras Alula would be sent to Omdurman with Yohannes’ head. See Al-Zaki Tamal to 
the Khalifa, undated, CAIRINT 1/29/148/98, NRO. However, Ras Alula did not perish at the battle of Gallabat: 
“Ras Alula’s head was never received; he remained its possessor although he lost almost everything else.” 
Haggai Erlich, Ras Alula and the Scramble for Africa: A Political Biography: Ethiopia and Eritrea, 1875–
1897 (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1996), 136. Ras Alula died in early 1897, after a fight against a 
rival in which his leg was wounded. See Haggai Erlich, “Alula Ǝngәda” in Encyclopaedia Aethiopica 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2005), 1: 213. Ras Hayla Maryam actually died at the battle of Gallabat. 
64 Ohrwalder, Aufstand und Reich des Mahdi, 180. 
65 Alice Moore-Harell, “Economic and Political Aspects of the Slave Trade in Ethiopia and the Sudan 
in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 32, 2–3 
(1999), 409. 
66 Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, Slaves into Workers: Emancipation and Labor in Colonial Sudan (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1996), 5. This statement is vague because of the plurality of meanings and 
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church allows Christians to own slaves but theoretically forbids them to be involved in 
slave-trading activities.67 While taking into account the normative authority of these texts, 
I agree with Ahmad Alawad Sikainga’s argument that “the status of slaves in many parts of 
the Muslim world and their day-to-day existence were determined by social reality more 
than religious norms.”68 As an institution, slavery is historically entrenched in the social, 
economic and cultural structures of Sudan and Ethiopia. It is in both cases a particularly 
ancient institution.69 
During the Mahdist period, the rulers of the Sudanese and Ethiopian states were the 
biggest owners of slaves within their respective societies. In Sudan, the Khalifa, his family 
and the great emirs owned vast agricultural estates in the provinces, where they employed 
servile labor.70 Although the slave trade within Mahdist territories was legalized, reaching 
significant dimensions, exports beyond Sudan were strictly forbidden. This policy was 
shaped by purely pragmatic motives: the Khalifa sought to eliminate the possibility of 
exported slaves being enrolled into enemy forces, such as the Anglo-Egyptian army. The 
restriction of the slave trade to Sudan thus ensued from a military strategy, not from 
abolitionist efforts.71 The allegation of the historian Jok Madut, according to which the 
revenues of the Mahdist state came mainly from slavery and the slave trade, seems 
therefore groundless.72 On the Ethiopian side, the emperor was the greatest owner of 
slaves. Yohannes made tremendous benefits from the slave trade, as he controlled the flow 
of caravans heading for Sudan.73 Despite declarations condemning slavery, the emperor 
did not implement any meaningful measure to prevent his subjects from organizing slave 
                                                                                                                                              
interpretations ascribed to the concept of jihad, which could serve as a religious legitimizing device for any 
raid. See Seri-Hersch, “Confronting a Christian Neighbor,” 256. 
67 Abir, “The Ethiopian Slave Trade,” 127. 
68 Sikainga, Slaves into Workers, 5. Sikainga bolsters his thesis with the assertion that the great 
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69 Abir, “The Ethiopian Slave Trade,” 126; Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1974 
(London: J. Currey, 1991), 34; Heather J. Sharkey, “Luxury, Status, and the Importance of Slavery in the 
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70 Sikainga, Slaves into Workers, 31. 
71 Ohrwalder, Aufstand und Reich des Mahdi, 275; Naqd, ‘Alaqat al-Riqq, 91; AbuShouk, “Ideology 
versus Pragmatism,” 158. 
72 Madut Jok Jok, War and Slavery in Sudan (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 
89. For more details on the revenues of the Mahdist state, see Slatin Pascha, Feuer und Schwert, 2: 231–34; 
Nakash, “Fiscal and Monetary Systems,” 371–74; AbuShouk and Bjørkelo, The Public Treasury, 13–15; 
AbuShouk, “Ideology versus Pragmatism,” 151, 155–61. 
73 Moore-Harell, “Economic and Political Aspects,” 412. Moore-Harell gives the number of 20,000 
Egyptian pounds a year and evaluates the Egyptian pound at one pound sterling 2.5 pence in the 1870s. 
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raids. The fact that he accepted to abolish the slave trade in a treaty signed with the British 
in 1884 had little impact on slave-trading activities in Ethiopia.74 
The Sudanese-Ethiopian borderlands were a major arena of enslaving and trading 
activities. This was related to the geographical and cultural background of slaves, which 
was not arbitrary. People considered as “peripheral” by state elites were often targeted. 
Culturally or religiously different from the dominant society, these groups could be—on 
moral grounds—more easily enslaved than people closely associated with the culture of the 
ruling elites.75 Populations inhabiting border zones between Sudan and Ethiopia, such as 
the Bertha, Burun, Gunza, Ingessana, Jum Jum, Mao, Khoma, Meban and Uduk people76 
were “peripherized” by both states and became the target of many raids. In Ethiopia, the 
label Shangalla had for centuries been pejoratively used by highlanders to refer to pagan 
people living in the lowlands. The term came to be associated with slavery, for people 
designated by it were “reservoir populations of potential slaves.”77 
Finally, the ways in which slaves were acquired were common to Sudanese and 
Ethiopian societies. Trade, war booty and raids per se constituted the most widespread 
means to acquire slaves. In Sudan, the Khalifa forcefully recruited into his army slaves 
who had deserted their master and fled to Omdurman.78 In Ethiopia, parents struck by 
ecological or financial catastrophes used to sell their children as slaves.79 Thus, the 
combined phenomenon of slavery and the slave trade contributed to the exchange of 
human beings between Mahdist Sudan and Ethiopia. The sources I have consulted incline 
me to argue that the trade route leading slaves from Ethiopia to Sudan was more 
frequented than the opposite direction.80 The largest Sudanese slave market could be found 
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The Southern Marches, 121. For a Gumuz conception opposing a Shangalla slave identity to a Funj identity 
associated with freedom, see Wendy James, “Perceptions from an African Slaving Frontier,” in Archer, ed., 
Slavery, 135. 
78 Sikainga, Slaves into Workers, 30. 
79 Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 22. 
80 It was already a major trade route before the Mahdist period. In the mid-nineteenth century, between 
13,000 and 17,000 slaves passed each year on this route. During the 1860s, British geographer Clements 
Markham described the slave market of Metemma (Gallabat) as “flourishing.” In the summer of 1862, over 
forty caravans of non-Christian Ethiopian slaves reached Gallabat to be sold there. Many Sudanese 
merchants traveled to Gondar in order to purchase slaves originating from southern Ethiopia. They had a 
significant religious, cultural, and political impact on the city. See “The History of Gallabat,” Sudan Notes 
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in Omdurman. Men and women coming from Bahr al-Ghazal, Darfur and the Nuba 
Mountains were purchased there, besides Ethiopians who had been captured by the armies 
of al-Dikaym and Abu ‘Anja. Ohrwalder stresses that Ethiopian slaves were not suitable 
for hard labor such as water carrying and corn grinding. Most of them worked in the 
harem.81 Ethiopian women were traditionally in high demand in Sudan, as they were very 
appreciated as domestic workers and concubines. Their cost was thus more elevated than 
that of their male counterparts.82 
Trade and war booty were fundamental modes of circulation of goods, animals and 
human beings through eastern Sudan and western Ethiopia. However, movements of 
people from one region to the other were not necessarily temporary (as in the case of 
traders) or constrained (as in the case of slaves). There were categories of individuals who 
chose—willingly or not—to cross the invisible Sudanese-Ethiopian border in order to join 
the opposite camp in a long-term perspective. 
Political and Religious Asylum: Individual Trajectories of Migration and Dissent 
The border zone between Sudan and Ethiopia was an arena of individual and collective 
“voluntary” migrations,83 stirred by political, religious, economic, and ideological 
dynamics. Population movements involved migrants from both countries, several of whom 
were fierce opponents to the established political regimes. According to Richard A. Caulk, 
relations between the rulers of Sudan and those of Ethiopia were characterized by “their 
habit of supporting malcontents for whom the unsettled borderlands offered easy asylum 
and a predatory career.”84 The border zone was a place of refuge for individuals escaping 
from the control of the Sudanese and Ethiopian states. The deteriorating economic and 
                                                                                                                                              
and Records 7 (1924), 97–98; Moore-Harell, “Economic and Political Aspects,” 413–14; Pankhurst, “History 
of the Bareya,” 24; Abir, “The Ethiopian Slave Trade,” 130–31. Despite official prohibitions of the slave 
trade on both sides of the 1902 border, reduced flows of slaves going from Ethiopia to Sudan continued well 
into the twentieth century: in 1927, 800 slaves from southwestern Ethiopia were dispatched to Gojjam and 
Sudan. See Fernyhough, “Social Mobility and Dissident Elites,” 160. Conversely, evidence shows that 
Sudanese people were enslaved and brought to Ethiopia in the early years of the twentieth century, see 
Garretson, “Frontier Feudalism,” 265, 272. 
81 Ohrwalder, Aufstand und Reich des Mahdi, 274. 
82 Sikainga, Slaves into Workers, 22, 225 n. 113. In the Mahdist period, a female slave often cost twice 
the price of a male slave. 
83 Although the distinction between forced migrations and voluntary migrations is not a clear-cut one, I 
use the second term to emphasize the notion of choice and the fact that many migrants actively fought the 
political and religious order they had deliberately left. 
84 Caulk, “Yohannes IV, the Mahdists,” 30. In the first part of the nineteenth century, a famous refugee 
from Sudan was Makk Nimr, who fled from Shendi on the Nile to the Ethiopian borderlands in 1822, 
avoiding Turco-Egyptian heavy taxation and political control. See Henri Dehérain, Le Soudan Egyptien sous 
Mehemet Ali (Paris: G. Carré and C. Naud, 1898), 96–98. 
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security conditions of the late 1880s85 made the borderlands a zone where political 
rebellion and banditry flourished. Two shefta of humble origin that had started their 
careers in the borderlands during the Mahdist period managed to gain high office in early 
twentieth-century Ethiopia: Kidana Maryam and Hayla Maryam.86 Let us examine 
individual itineraries of “transborder” migrations stemming from political and religious 
dissent, which sometimes involved banditry activities. 
Regarding migrations from Sudan to Ethiopia, the case of Salih Shanga appears 
most often in Mahdist correspondences and later historical sources. Educated as an imam 
at al-Azhar, he was the sheikh of the Takarir of Gallabat and had been governor of the 
town under Turco-Egyptian rule.87 He was responsible for levying taxes and maintaining 
trade connections with Ethiopia. Shanga relied on a private army of 4,000 warriors 
equipped with firearms, who were employed on his agricultural estates in peaceful times. 
When the Mahdist revolution broke out, he remained loyal to the Turco-Egyptian 
government and did not subsequently modify his political stance. His staunch opposition to 
the Mahdiyya ensued from the fact that he had benefited from an excellent situation under 
the Turkiyya88: trade routes going through Gallabat provided him with great profits and he 
had managed to keep good relations with neighboring Ethiopia.89 Shanga indeed 
succeeded in gathering support from Ethiopian tribes to fight against the Mahdists, and he 
inflicted a serious defeat on them on November 7, 1884. He accompanied the evacuation of 
Egyptian troops towards Ethiopia (February 28, 1885) and settled in western Gojjam. The 
Takruri sheikh became an important commander of the Ethiopian state. He initiated several 
campaigns against Mahdist Sudan and encouraged Takla Haimanot to attack Gallabat in 
January 1887.90 
Salih Shanga was not the only refugee of Mahdism to settle down in that Ethiopian 
region. ‘Ijayl ‘Awd al-Hamrani, the leader of an anti-Mahdist faction from the Hamran 
Arabs, took his partisans to Ghabta (an Ethiopian village in the border zone), from where 
they started attacking Sudanese villages. Several sources stress the opportunist nature of 
                                                
85 Between 1887 and 1889, the Sudanese-Ethiopian borderlands suffered from cattle plague, harvest 
failure, and military operations, which greatly increased the number of hungry bandits in the region. See 
Fernyhough, “Social Mobility and Dissident Elites,” 157. 
86 Balanbras Bozna Venis Balezla Governor of Jelga to En Nur Salaa, early Jumada al-Ula 
1312/November 1894, MAHDIA 1/34/10B, NRO; Timothy Fernyhough, “Interpreting Ethiopian Banditry: A 
Revisionist View,” in Papers of the XIIIth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies. Kyoto, 12–17 
December 1997 (Kyoto: Shokado Book Sellers), 65, 73. Such political mobility was exceptional for bandits 
of lowly background, though it was an essential part of Ethiopian noble banditry. 
87 Holt, The Mahdist State, 48; al-Gaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 17. 
88 The term Turk was used by nineteenth-century Sudanese to refer to their Turco-Egyptian rulers, 
whose regime came to be known as the Turkiyya. 
89 Al-Gaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 27. According to Schuver, ivory from southwestern 
Ethiopia was “sent by the prince of Gojjam (Ras Adal) via Dongur, to the Sheikh of the Tukruri [sic] negroes 
(Sheikh Salih) of Galabat […] and sold there”: Schuver, Juan Maria Schuver’s Travels, 276. 
90 Ohrwalder, Aufstand und Reich des Mahdi, 156; al-Gaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 29. 
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these activities: ‘Ijayl and his companions had on their mind nothing else than plundering, 
devastating villages along the Atbara river, which had unwillingly been submitted to the 
Mahdiyya.91 When Takla Haimanot assaulted the town of Gallabat, ‘Ijayl supported him 
by occupying Doka and massacring its inhabitants.92 
A third character named al-Muddawi ‘Abd al-Rahman found refuge in western 
Ethiopia. He had initially been a fervent supporter of the Mahdiyya, taking part in the siege 
of Khartoum (March 1884–January 1885). After the Mahdi’s death (22 June 1885), this 
man “recognized his folly and fled from Omdurman.”93 Joining Salih Shanga, he stayed 
some time in Ethiopia and then went to Cairo (1890). He came back to Sudan after the 
collapse of Mahdism and died there in 1899. The Khalifa considered him as one of the 
greatest traitors to the Mahdist cause—after Shanga—because he had supported Takla 
Haimanot’s attack of Gallabat.94 
I have less information on Ethiopians who took flight to Mahdist Sudan. Let us 
nonetheless mention three distinct cases.  
First, a Jabarti (Ethiopian Muslim) called al-Nur wad Fagran migrated to Kordofan 
at the beginning of the Mahdist revolution. The Mahdi appointed him as emir and sent him 
back to Ethiopia to propagate Mahdism among his people. Fagran returned to the 
Sudanese-Ethiopian border zone, gathered men at Gedaref and vainly attempted to invade 
the village of Gadabi.95 He then settled in the camp of Tabarak Allah,96 where he 
organized incursions into Ethiopian territory. 
Second, another Jabarti named Muhammad Jibril, went to Sudan and gave his 
allegiance to the Mahdi shortly before the latter’s death. He was then sent back to Ethiopia 
in order to spread the Mahdist predication among Christians and Muslims alike.97 His 
                                                
91 Al-‘Azm, Rihlat al-Habasha, 170; al-Gaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 25. Garretson emphasizes 
that these raids stirred Mahdist counter raids which devastated the Ethiopian highlands; these remained 
uncultivated for more than one decade, see Garretson, “Frontier Feudalism,” 267. 
92 Ohrwalder, Aufstand und Reich des Mahdi, 158. 
93 Ibid., 157. My translation. Al-Gaddal suggests that al-Muddawi’s faith in the Mahdiyya was shallow: 
al-Gaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 57 n. 2. Viviane Yagi argues that he had opportunistically embraced 
the Mahdist cause: Viviane A. Yagi, Le Tiraz: Chronique sur la Guerre Soudano-Abyssine de 1885–1889 
(Omdurman, 1984), unpublished French translation of al-Kurdufani, Al-Tiraz al-Manqush [see note 22 
above], 194 n. 59. 
94 Ohrwalder, Aufstand und Reich des Mahdi, 157. 
95 Al-Gaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 33–34. The confrontation took place on November 26, 
1884. Fagran’s forces lost circa 700 men against Ethiopian warriors supported by Salih Shanga. 
96 Tabarak Allah was a military camp founded by Jabarti who had fled Yohannes’ persecutions. See al-
‘Azm, Rihlat al-Habasha, 170. 
97 Ibid., 169. 
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activities provoked the wrath of Yohannes, who intensified persecutions against Muslim 
Ethiopians.98 
The third instance is probably the most interesting and controversial one. It 
involves the son of Tewodros II (Ethiopian emperor from 1855 to 1868). Called Tewodros 
Kassa, he went to Gallabat after Abu ‘Anja’s victorious campaign to Dembea and Gondar 
(January 1888). He converted to Islam, offered the Mahdists an alliance against Ethiopia 
and was sent to Omdurman, where the Khalifa received him “with many marks of 
respect.”99 The two men reached an agreement, according to which the Khalifa promised 
Tewodros Kassa the Ethiopian throne in exchange for the Ethiopians’ conversion to 
Mahdist Islam and the payment of an annual tribute.100 It is useful to remember that after 
his father’s surrender to the British army at Maqdala (1868), Tewodros Kassa had been 
hidden by relatives in order to prevent Yohannes from killing him. In the late 1880s, he 
thought that an alliance with the Mahdists could help him to regain the throne of Negusä 
nägäst (“King of kings,” the traditional title for Ethiopian emperors).101 
In the Mahdist period, individuals and groups coming from Sudan and Ethiopia 
decided to flee their country and take an active part in military or missionary operations of 
the opposite side. At times, their migratory act had significant repercussions on Sudanese-
Ethiopian relations. Those who were considered as “traitors” by the Khalifa were 
transformed into negotiating cards in his diplomatic exchanges with the Ethiopian 
emperor. The letter he addressed to Yohannes in early 1887, after the Ethiopian attack of 
Gallabat, clearly shows that Salih Shanga, ‘Ijayl ‘Awd al-Hamrani and Muddawi ‘Abd al-
Rahman represented a major political stake: 
If you wish to avoid war and Muslim raids in your country, you must firstly return 
all Muslim captives you have taken, males and females, free persons and slaves, 
young and old […] Secondly, if the men that have withdrawn and joined you such 
                                                
98 The persecution of Muslim Ethiopians was part of a wider Christianization policy implemented by 
the emperor in the 1880s. Al-‘Azm claims that during his trip to Ethiopia, he met Muslims whose hands and 
feet had been cut off on Yohannes’ order. See Ibid., 170. On these campaigns of forced conversions, which 
incited many Ethiopian Muslims inhabiting Gondar and Darita to flee towards Gallabat, see Ahmed, Islam in 
Nineteenth-Century Wallo, 175; Abdussamad H. Ahmad, “Darita, Bagemdir: An Historic Town and Its 
Muslim Population, 1830–1889,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 22, 3 (1989), 450–51. 
On Yohannes’ religious policy as part of a political scheme of imperial unification, see Trimingham, Islam in 
Ethiopia, 122–23; Richard A. Caulk, “Religion and State in Nineteenth-Century Ethiopia,” Journal of 
Ethiopian Studies 10, 1 (1972), 23–41; Zewde Gabre-Sellassie, Yohannes IV of Ethiopia: A Political 
Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 251; Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 48–49; Sven 
Rubenson, Internal Rivalries and Foreign Threats, 1869–1879 (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 
2000), 317, 333. 
99 Ohrwalder, Aufstand und Reich des Mahdi, 174. My translation. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. Ohrwalder claims that he knew him personally and that he had often talked with him. The 
historian Zewde Gabre-Sellassie names him “Abd al-Rahman ibn Tewodros” (seemingly his Mahdist name) 
and argues that he was the son of a cousin of Emperor Tewodros rather than the son of the emperor himself. 
See Gabre-Sellassie, Yohannes IV of Ethiopia, 243. 
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as Salih Shanga, Idris Abu Jinn, ‘Ijayl and Muddawi, are willing to return to their 
religion and surrender, liberate them from your country and send them to us. If they 
persist in their desertion and choose apostasy, take their statements down on paper, 
sealed with their seals, and send them to us so that we may count them among your 
nation [qawm], your party, your religious community [milla], and your army. 
Thirdly, stop transgressing the land of Islam from now on, and stay within your 
boundaries [hudud].102 
Shaping and Enforcing Socio-Diplomatic Norms in Epistolary Exchanges 
Up to this point, our discussion has dealt with circulation patterns pertaining to goods and 
people. Ideas, norms, and representations also flowed between Sudan and Ethiopia. At the 
state level, the diplomatic game—in the shape of epistolary exchanges—constituted a 
central mode of transmission of such immaterial items. I should highlight the fact that 
textual exchanges were not the prerogative of the two supreme rulers, Khalifa ‘Abdullahi 
and Emperor Yohannes. Governors and lower-rank officers took an active part in 
diplomatic interactions between the two states. The rich correspondence between Emir 
Hamdan Abu ‘Anja and Negus Takla Haimanot (named “Ras ‘Adal” or “Ras ‘Adar” in 
Mahdist sources) provides an outstanding example. 
The Mahdist emir sent a letter to the Ethiopian governor after he defeated him at 
Dembea (January 1888). Although it is not precisely dated (the month is omitted from the 
date: 21 ? 1305), its contents indicates that Abu ‘Anja was still in Ethiopia when he wrote 
it. His intransigent tone conveys a militant jihadist outlook. He reproached Takla Haimanot 
for not having adhered to Mahdist Islam, making him responsible for Ethiopian losses at 
Dembea.103 Abu ‘Anja threatened to plunder the area and massacre its inhabitants as long 
as the Ethiopian leader would not recite the shahada. The most interesting aspect of this 
letter, however, relates to social and material conventions regulating diplomatic 
communication. The Mahdist commander finished his dispatch with a note about his 
messenger: 
My messenger who carries this for you is Nakitad Ras Hassan Kradia. He has been 
always a preacher of good to men. Be gentle to him, and send an answer with him 
immediately. Do not harm him for this is the law that no messenger should be 
killed or imprisoned, or even insulted. He is only one man, no more no less.104 
                                                
102 Shuqayr, Ta’rikh, 729–731. My translation. The Khalifa did not specify the location of the border. 
For an English version wrongly dated July 1887, see Wingate, Mahdiism, 332–33. “Traitors” of the Mahdist 
cause were also discussed in correspondences between lower-rank officials, as will be shown in the next 
section. 
103 Hamdan Abu ‘Anja to Aziz Gojjam Ras ‘Adar Takla Haimanot, 21 ? 1305 / October 1887–
September 1888, MAHDIA 1/34/16A/54, NRO. My supposition regarding the letter’s date (21 Jumada al-Ula 
1305 / 4 February 1888) is sustained by al-Gaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 113 n. 1. 
104 Hamdan Abu ‘Anja to Aziz Gojjam Ras ‘Adar Takla Haimanot, 21 ? 1305 / October 1887–
September 1888, MAHDIA 1/34/16A/54, NRO. 
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Correspondences thus seem to be governed by behavioral norms that are quite 
independent from the proper contents of the letters. Indeed, Abu ‘Anja’s aggressive 
attitude did not prevent him from kindly reminding his enemy of the rules of good conduct 
appropriate for this type of epistolary interaction. 
Three weeks later, the Mahdist emir dispatched two other letters to Takla 
Haimanot. In the first one, he confirmed the reception of a message from him through his 
Jabarti envoys Muhammad Salih and Hajj ‘Abdallah.105 The Ethiopian official had offered 
to release the prisoners he had captured a year before, during the attack of Gallabat 
(January 1887), and to pay him a tribute in exchange for peace. Abu ‘Anja reacted in an 
ambivalent manner: on the one hand, he mentioned the governor’s conversion to Islam as a 
necessary condition for any discussion; on the other hand, he suggested that the arrest of 
“corrupters”106 such as Salih Shanga, ‘Ijayl ‘Awd al-Hamrani and Muddawi ‘Abd al-
Rahman could form the basis of a possible dialogue. The second letter of Abu ‘Anja, dated 
the same day as the first one, also included this ambivalent message. In addition, it dealt 
with a particularly sensitive and intimate topic: the fate of Takla Haimanot’s relatives who 
were captured by Mahdist forces during the Dembea campaign. The emir informed him of 
his daughter’s death, attempting to minimize the dramatic impact of such news: 
death is right, and there is no doubt that every living creature, but God, must die; no 
one but God will remain. There is no date for each creature to die on, but God will 
never delay, when the time comes. Your daughter Mentwab has perished and met 
her death naturally, that was her day, which God whished her to die on, and if she 
was with you she would not have lived one day longer, or one day less, this is 
God’s will to his servants.107 
Abu ‘Anja considerably softened his tone when dealing with personal matters. He 
reassured Takla Haimanot on the situation of his daughters Danki and Shashti.108 His son 
Maknon had recovered from a bullet wound and was well taken care of. The Mahdist emir 
nevertheless exploited the detention of Takla Haimanot’s relatives to convince him to 
convert to Mahdist Islam.109 In this letter, the messengers again played a crucial role, not 
only as efficient transmitters, but also as direct witnesses of the situation in each camp. 
Abu ‘Anja insisted on the fact that Takla Haimanot’s messengers had seen and talked to 
his daughters.110 
                                                
105 Hamdan Abu ‘Anja to Negus Takla Haimanot, 15 Jumada al-Akhira 1305 / 27 February 1888, 
MAHDIA 1/34/16/2, NRO. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Hamdan Abu ‘Anja to Negus Takla Haimanot, 15 Jumada al-Akhira 1305 / 27 February 1888, 
MAHDIA 1/34/16A/38, NRO. 
108 The names of Takla Haimanot’s daughters vary from one letter to another. One can find “Ranki and 
Shasta,” “Danki and Shashti,” “Danki and Shashta.” The fact that these letters are English translations of 
Arabic original texts explains their frequent distortions of words. 
109 Hamdan Abu ‘Anja to Negus Takla Haimanot, 15 Jumada al-Akhira 1305 / 27 February 1888, 
MAHDIA 1/34/16A/38, NRO. 
110 Ibid. 
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Negus Takla Haimanot replied to Abu ‘Anja’s letters through two messages he 
successively sent on April 5 and May 12, 1888.111 Their tone is extremely courteous and 
respectful towards Abu ‘Anja and the Mahdists in general. For instance, the Ethiopian 
governor used the following formulas: 
“To my beloved in God, the honourable Emir Hamdan Abu Anja, the Emirs of all 
Kallabat’s Emirs” 
“After presenting to you and to all friendly Emirs and all the Ansar112 our warm 
greetings, we inform you that your dear letter (…) has arrived.” 
“My beloved if it pleases you (…).”113 
Takla Haimanot thanked the Mahdist emir for the respect and good treatment 
granted to his daughter during her illness and her funerals. He wrote very politely that he 
wished to see his son and two daughters still detained by the Mahdists. He bolstered his 
request in two distinct ways: on the one hand, by emphasizing the “friendship and 
brotherhood” linking the two commanders; on the other by expressing his gratefulness to 
Abu ‘Anja through the grant of a maid or any other commodity he should like. 
The Ethiopian governor’s rhetoric can be elucidated by two possible explanations. 
First, the few quiet months following the Dembea campaign and the devastation of Gondar 
allowed courteous exchanges between the Mahdist and Ethiopian leaders.114 The second 
hypothesis seems more probable: Takla Haimanot’s weak position pushed him to attempt 
to coax his Mahdist enemies. His vulnerability resulted not only from the ruin that the 
Mahdists had spread in his province, but also from his buffer role between Emperor 
Yohannes and his powerful rival Menilek.115 Therefore he expressed his wish that he and 
Abu ‘Anja become great friends, “giving a deaf ear to all those who like to interrupt [their] 
peaceful relations by their evil whispers.”116 It does not seem that the Mahdist emir reacted 
to the overtures of the governor of Gojjam. The Sudanese-Ethiopian entente concluded in 
early 1897 had no impact on the fate of the Ethiopian prisoners, who remained the 
                                                
111 The Negus’ messenger fell ill on the way and delayed the arrival of the first letter. That is why 
Takla Haimanot sent another one with his son Dasta. See Negus Takla Haimanot to Hamdan Abu ‘Anja, 30 
Sha‘ban 1305 / 12 May 1888, MAHDIA 1/34/10B/163, NRO. 
112 The Mahdi called his supporters Ansar in reference to the Prophet Muhammad’s first disciples in 
Medina. 
113 Negus Takla Haimanot to Hamdan Abu ‘Anja, 30 Sha‘ban 1305 / 12 May 1888, MAHDIA 
1/34/10B/163, NRO; Negus Takla Haimanot to Hamdan Abu ‘Anja, 22 Rajab 1305 / 5 April 1888, MAHDIA 
1/34/1/160, NRO. 
114 Sanderson, “Conflict and Co-operation,” 21. Sanderson mentions the role of a “personal factor” 
without elaborating further. See Ibid., n. 4. 
115 Ibid., 22. Al-Gaddal also favors this explanation. He adds that Takla Haimanot had been impressed 
by Abu ‘Anja’s military aptitudes and strove to gain time while Yohannes was busy with fighting the Italians 
in the east. See al-Gaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 114. 
116 Negus Takla Haimanot to Hamdan Abu ‘Anja, 30 Sha‘ban 1305 / 12 May 1888, MAHDIA 
1/34/10B/163, NRO. 
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Khalifa’s hostages until the fall of the Mahdist state two years later. The survivors were 
eventually repatriated by Kitchener.117 
Conclusion 
Studying the border concept and various modes of circulation of goods, human beings, and 
social-diplomatic norms between Sudan and Ethiopia sheds light on the complex role of 
the borderlands in the evolution of Sudanese-Ethiopian relations. In the second half of the 
1880s, this area cannot be identified as a clearly delimited and delimiting line, nor as a 
territory completely disconnected from the Mahdist and Ethiopian political and religious 
orbits. Commercial, military, and political dynamics made it a zone that both separated and 
linked Sudan with Ethiopia. Different political and religious conceptions and strategies 
underlie the divergent conceptualizations of the border by Sudanese and Ethiopian ruling 
groups. Conversely, commercial and diplomatic activities brought border populations as 
well as political elites closer, be it through personal connections or the elaboration of a 
shared political culture. As for military operations, they are of quite a paradoxical nature, 
for they strengthened antagonisms between the Mahdist and Ethiopian camps while 
creating similarities of practice (war booty) that established warfare standards shared by 
both societies. 
One of the striking aspects of the border zone is the longevity of the dynamics it is 
subject to.118 Most of the processes I have discussed have indeed persisted up to this day. 
For instance, the border concept is still at the focus of intergovernmental tensions, 
although a line was demarcated in the early days of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. 
Commercial exchanges are crucial for the economic survival of each country, because of 
their climatic and geographical differences.119 Falling within Sudanese territory, the town 
of Gallabat distinguishes itself by the mingling of Sudanese and Ethiopian cultures, which 
is salient in such varied fields as gastronomy, family ties (mixed marriages are common), 
and linguistic practices (Arabic and Amharic bilingualism).120 In addition, the last decades 
have witnessed intensive bidirectional migrations between Sudan and Ethiopia / Eritrea. 
Ethiopian and Eritrean nationals constitute the largest group of recent migrants in 
                                                
117 Sanderson, “Conflict and Co-operation,” 22 n. 1. 
118 The anthropologist Wendy James has already noticed the persistence, between the 1880s and the 
1980s, of certain social, political and cultural patterns characterizing borderlands located to the south of the 
Blue Nile. She even suggests the existence of a “frontier character” shared by several different local 
communities. See Wendy James, “The Upper Blue Nile: Re-reading a Nineteenth-Century Text,” in Hervé 
Bleuchot et al., Sūdān: History, Identity, Ideology; Histoire, Identités, Idéologies (Aix-en-Provence: Iremam, 
1991), 45–70. 
119 Mustafa Babiker (anthropologist), personal interview with author at the Development Studies and 
Research Institute (DSRI), University of Khartoum, 29 February 2007. Whereas Sudan benefits from an 
access to the Red Sea, Ethiopia lost its coastal territory with the independence of Eritrea in 1993. However, 
Ethiopia enjoys a productive agriculture all year long, which is not the case of Sudan. 
120 Ibid. 
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Sudan.121 Their movement is mainly due to political and economic causes, which have 
varied according to changes of regimes and droughts that have successively plagued the 
region since the 1960s.122 Even though I have less information about migrations in the 
opposite direction, my personal experience in Khartoum taught me that many opponents to 
Omar al-Bashir’s regime, especially sympathizers of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
(SPLA), have found refuge in Ethiopia from the 1980s up to this day.123 Though the 
borderlands came to be delimited by a legal boundary after the Mahdist period, patterns of 
military competition, shifting political allegiances, and population displacement have 
endured in the post-imperial context of Sudanese and Ethiopian civil wars.124 
                                                
121 Fabienne Le Houérou, Migrants Forcés Ethiopiens et Erythréens en Egypte et au Soudan, 
Passagers d’un Monde à l’Autre (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004), 14. 
122 Ibid., 37, 41–43, 50–51. A first wave of migrants is linked to the Eritrean war of independence 
waged in the 1960s. The 1974 wave followed the revolution that overthrew Negus Haile Sellassie. In the 
1980s, people marginalized by the Mengistu regime shared the experience of migration with Eritreans 
seeking independence. Finally, the fall of Mengistu in 1991 provoked the flight of his supporters towards 
Sudan. In 2002, the number of Ethiopian and Eritrean migrants dwelling in Sudanese urban areas was 
estimated at more than half a million people. 
123 See also Alain Gascon, “La Guerre ‘Discrète’ du Soudan,” LiMes: Revue Française de 
Géopolitique 3 (1997), 151, 158; James, “The Upper Blue Nile,” 48–50. 
124 See Wendy James, War and Survival in Sudan’s Frontierlands: Voices from the Blue Nile (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007) for a historical and anthropological analysis of the southern border zone in 
the light of recent Sudanese and Ethiopian political, economic, social, and military dynamics. 
